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Abstract This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of ver-
iable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests,
i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is in-
terim always more likely to win than the other player (the underdog). A condition
is identied that ensures that a given contest is unfair regardless of disclosure deci-
sions. Under this condition, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest
type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of
the favorite will try to discourage the underdog so that the contest unravels. We
also show that self-disclosure may, with positive probability, provoke unintended re-
actions, i.e., dominantor deantbehavior. Moreover, while individually rational
for the marginal type, the unraveling may be strictly Pareto inferior from an ex-ante
perspective. Our main conclusion is just the opposite of the corresponding nding for
the deterministic all-pay auction. The proofs employ lattice-theoretic methods and
an improved version of Jensens inequality.
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1. Introduction
The economics literature has a long tradition of studying incentives for the voluntary
disclosure of private information. Seminal contributions by Grossman (1981) and
Milgrom (1981) considered markets with quality uncertainty in which buyers derive
their beliefs from veriable information. In this type of environment, a product that
is not certied will be perceived to be of average quality only. Therefore, in the
absence of countervailing forces or alternative channels of communication, a seller
would nd it optimal to disclose any veriable information that provides evidence
of above-average quality. But since this is anticipated by the buyers, the perceived
quality of uncertied products will decline further. As a result, there is an unraveling
process that may ultimately force all sellers to disclose their private information.
Since its inception, this disclosure principle has been gradually rened and extended
through a large number of contributions.1
However, all-pay contests do not satisfy existing conditions su¢ cient for the dis-
closure principle in the strong form, according to which any perfect Bayesian (or
sequential) equilibrium entails full revelation.2 The purpose of the present paper is
it to extend the strong-form disclosure principle to a large class of probabilistic con-
tests. Clearly, there are forces that favor disclosure in contests. After all, if a player
is relatively strong, then there should be, at least in some cases, a strict benet from
letting the weaker opponent know about this. Indeed, with the information revealed,
the contest should become more lopsided, which would make it easier for the stronger
player to win. Conversely, a relatively weak player might want to inform the oppo-
1See, for instance, Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990), Seidman and
Winter (1997), Benoît and Dubra (2006), Giovannoni and Seidman (2007), Van Zandt and Vives
(2007), and Hagenbach et al. (2014). Surveys of the literature can be found in Milgrom (2008) and
Dranove and Jin (2010).
2The main complication is that best-response mappings are not monotone in a contest. Cf. Denter
et al. (2014) and Kovenock et al. (2015). For an introduction to the burgeoning literature on all-pay
contests, see Konrad (2009).
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nent that the battle will be excessively unequal, thereby inducing the stronger player
to choose a more moderate strategy.3 While these e¤ects (especially the rst) might
look familiar, their signicance for the scope of the disclosure principle has apparently
been overlooked so far.
In this paper, we extend the standard model of a probabilistic contest (Rosen,
1986; Dixit, 1987) by allowing for pre-play communication of veriable information
(Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Van Zandt and Vives, 2007; Hagenbach et al., 2014).
The contestants are assumed to di¤er in their marginal cost of e¤ort, which is pri-
vate information to them. However, at a stage preceding the contest, any player
may interim, i.e., subsequent to having observed her type, choose to disclose that
information to her opponent. The focus of the present paper lies on contests that
are unfair in the sense that there is one player that, subject to activity, is interim
always strictly more likely to win than the other player.4 We identify a condition
that guarantees that the contest stage ensuing the pre-play exchange of information
is unfair regardless of playersdisclosure decisions. As will be discussed, this condition
is consistent with both asymmetric technologies (e.g., OKee¤e et al., 1984; Meyer,
1992; Feess et al., 2008; Epstein et al., 2013; Franke et al., 2014) and heterogeneous
type distributions (e.g., Amann and Leininger, 1996; Maskin and Riley, 2000).
In this type of framework, we evaluate the incentives of individual types of each
player to voluntarily disclose their private information. Moreover, we characterize the
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the resulting two-stage game. Our
3Real-world examples of such disclosure include, for instance, weapon tests (Beardsley and Asal,
2009), witness intimidation (Maynard, 1994), bragging (Alfano and Robinson, 2014), and acts of
supplication (Pedrick, 1982; van Kleef et al., 2006). It is conceded that in some of these examples,
misrepresentation may be possible to some degree, and that veriability may be costly to some extent.
However, since the incentives that we identify are all strict, this does not generally invalidate our
analysis.
4The focus on unfair contests is motivated by the fact, established below, that the strong-form
disclosure principle may fail in ex-ante symmetric contests.
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main result says that, provided that the contest stage is unfair in the sense discussed
above, the only outcome of the revelation game consistent with the assumption of
perfect Bayesian rationality is the one in which all the privately held information
is unfolded prior to the contest. Thus, we nd general conditions under which the
strong-form disclosure principle applies to a standard contest setting.
Figure 1. Best-response curves in an asymmetric contest of complete information.
The analysis revisits Dixits (1987, p. 893) observation that, in an asymmetric con-
test of complete information, the player more likely to win, the so-called favorite, has
a best-response function that is locally strictly increasing at the equilibrium, whereas
the player less likely to win, the so-called underdog, has a best-response function that
is locally strictly declining at the equilibrium. For example, in Figure 1, at the equi-
librium (x1; x

2), player 1s best-response function 1  1(x2) is strictly increasing,
while player 2s best-response function 2  2(x1) is strictly declining. We extend
Dixits (1987) observation to a setting with incomplete information. Thus, also in
our setting, there will be a favorite whose best-response mapping is locally strictly
increasing at the equilibrium, and an underdog whose best-response mapping is lo-
cally strictly declining at the equilibrium. There is, however, an important di¤erence.
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Specically, with incomplete information, strategy spaces are multi-dimensional lat-
tices, reecting the fact that each type of a given player may choose a di¤erent e¤ort
level.
While the proof of the unraveling result is not entirely straightforward, there is
a simple story. Specically, in view of the high e¤ort level to be expected from an
uninformed favorite, the weakest type of the underdog will have a strict incentive
to self-disclose, so as to moderate the favorite. But given that this is anticipated,
any silent types of the underdog will be confronted with an even higher e¤ort of the
favorite. The weakest of those remaining types will therefore choose to disclose her
type, and so on. Thus, there is an unraveling of the underdogs side. However, in the
resulting contest with one-sided incomplete information, the unraveling continues on
the side of the favorite. Indeed, the respective strongest type of the favorite has a
strict incentive to self-disclose, so as to discourage the underdog. In the end, there is
necessarily full revelation of all private information.
A central part of our analysis examines the monotone comparative statics of the
contest stage with respect to changes in the information structure. For this, we draw
on intuitions suggested by recent work on parameterized games of strategic hetero-
geneity (Monaco and Sabarwal, 2016). Quite notably, however, existing conditions do
not apply to our model.5 To clarify this point, we construct two examples in which a
players self-disclosure may trigger, respectively, a dominantor deantreaction
that runs squarely against the players intention to moderate or discourage the op-
ponent.6 These examples show that the relevant comparative statics of the Bayesian
equilibrium is, in general, monotone for one player only. In contrast, Monaco and
5Similarly, standard methods such as total di¤erentiation or variational inequalities fail to yield
any useful results.
6A conceptual discussion of dominance and deance, with numerous examples from politics and
history, can be found in Caygill (2013).
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Sabarwals (2016, Th. 5) conditions, like any of the conditions in the literature that
we are aware of, imply the monotone comparative statics of the entire equilibrium
prole. Thus, we indeed cannot make use of existing methods. Instead, we develop a
novel argument that will be outlined in the body of the paper.7
Finally, we compare full revelation with a benchmark outcome in which players do
not have the option to disclose their private information. This benchmark outcome
will be referred to as mandatory concealment. For a somewhat more structured envi-
ronment with one-sided incomplete information and an unbiased lottery technology,
we show that the unraveling is ex-ante strictly undesirable for a privately informed
underdog. In other words, full revelation obtains in this case just because the un-
derdog has ex ante no means of committing herself to not revealing her type. The
proof of this result relies on an improved version of Jensens inequality, which in
turn is derived using the theory of moment spaces (Dresher, 1953). We then go on
and show that, depending on parameters, the unraveling may even lead to a strictly
Pareto inferior outcome. We call this outcome the disclosure trap.However, such
possibilities are clearly not universal, i.e., there are examples in which a privately
informed contestant will appreciate disclosure not only interim, i.e., when being of
the marginal type, but also from an ex-ante perspective.
While noise and private information are essential in applications, probabilistic
contests of incomplete information have been studied since the early 90s only.8 The
general framework with one-sided and two-sided private valuations was introduced by
Hurley and Shogren (1998a, 1998b). Wärneryd (2003) made the intriguing observa-
7Even though the comparative statics is a central element of our analysis, additional arguments
are needed to put a denite sign on the type-specic incentives for disclosure. These additional
arguments will likewise be outlined in the body of the paper.
8Indeed, Rosen (1986, fn. 7) still complained that few analytical resultswere available. Early
papers considering probabilistic contests with incomplete information include Linster (1993) and
Baik and Shogren (1995), among others.
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tion that, in a set-up with one-sided incomplete information about a common valua-
tion, the uninformed player is more likely to win than the informed player. Malueg
and Yates (2004) analyzed a symmetric two-player Tullock contest with two equally
likely, but possibly correlated types. Schoonbeek and Winkel (2006) pointed out
that, in a contest of one-sided incomplete information, individual types may remain
inactive. For a large class of probabilistic incomplete-information contests, including
those considered in the present paper, Einy et al. (2015) established existence of a
Bayesian equilibrium, while Ewerhart and Quartieri (under review) proved existence
of a unique Bayesian equilibrium.
The present paper falls into the recent and quickly expanding literature concerned
with the disclosure of veriable information in contests.9 Research in this literature
has tended to focus on either ex-ante voluntary disclosure, optimal disclosure poli-
cies, or interim voluntary disclosure.10 Ex-ante voluntary disclosure in probabilistic
contests has been studied by Denter et al. (2014), in particular. Assuming a proba-
bilistic contest technology with one-sided incomplete information, they showed that a
laissez-fairepolicy regarding the informed players ex-ante disclosure decision leads
to lower expected lobbying expenditures than a policy of mandatory disclosure.11 The
second topic, optimal disclosure policies in contests, has recently seen a strong devel-
opment. In particular, e¤ort-maximizing disclosure policies have been characterized
9Another form of pre-play communication, not considered in the present paper, is the signaling
of unveriable information. See, e.g., Katsenos (2010), Slantchev (2010), Fu et al. (2013), Heijnen
and Schoonbeek (2017), and Yildirim (2017).
10Numerous additional research questions, related to learning, feedback, and motivation, for ex-
ample, arise in the analysis of dynamic contests of incomplete information. Such research questions
have been dealt with in papers by Clark (1997), Yildirim (2005), Krähmer (2007), Münster (2009),
Zhang and Wang (2009), Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), for
instance.
11Relatedly, Wu and Zheng (2017) considered a symmetric two-player lottery contest with two
equally likely, independently drawn types for each player. In this framework, they showed that
ex-ante disclosure decisions are fully revealing if and only if the two possible type realizations are
su¢ ciently close to each other.
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by Zhang and Zhou (2016) and Serena (2017) for probabilistic technologies, and by
Fu et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2017) for deterministic technologies.12 The present
analysis is concerned, however, with the third topic, i.e., the interim voluntary dis-
closure in contests. As far as we know, there is only one paper that has dealt with
this issue on a comparable level of generality.13 Specically, Kovenock et al. (2015)
showed that, regardless of whether valuations are private or common, the interim
information sharing game followed by an all-pay auction admits a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which no player ever shares her private information. The present analy-
sis is complementary to that of Kovenock et al. (2015) in the sense that, instead of
the all-pay auction, we consider a probabilistic contest. Overall, the review of the lit-
erature suggests that the specic research question pursued in the present paper, viz.
the analysis of incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of hard information in
ex-ante asymmetric contests with probabilistic technologies and two-sided incomplete
information, has not been addressed in prior work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-
up. The main result is stated in Section 3. Section 4 discusses contestantsincentives
for interim voluntary disclosure. In Section 5, we provide examples for nonmonotone
reactions to self-disclosure. A commitment problem is discussed in Section 6. Section
7 concludes. Appendix A contains auxiliary results, while all proofs of the results of
this paper have been relegated to Appendix B.
12In a similar vein, Einy et al. (2017) studied the value of public information in Tullock contests
with nonlinear costs. Optimal disclosure policies have been extensively analyzed also in models
of population uncertainty. See Münster (2006), Myerson and Wärneryd (2006), Lim and Matros
(2009), Fu et al. (2011), Feng and Lu (2016), and Fu et al. (2016), among others.
13However, Epstein and Mealem (2013) considered a lottery contest with one-sided incomplete
information, and characterized the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in the case of two possible
type realizations. In fact, Epstein and Mealem (2013) considered also an extension with more than
two types, yet they did not characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in that case.
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2. Set-up
Following the general framework of Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990),14 the dynamic game
to be considered is composed of two consecutive stages, referred to in the sequel as
revelation stage and contest stage. These stages will be separately described below,
following the backward order of the subsequent analysis.
2.1 The contest stage
Two players (or teams), referred to as contestants i = 1; 2, exert costly e¤orts so as to
increase their respective probability of winning a given prize that is commonly valued
at V > 0. Contestant is e¤ort (or bid) is denoted by xi  0. It is assumed that
player is payo¤ may be written as
i(x1; x2; ci) = pi(x1; x2)V   cixi, (1)
where pi(x1; x2) denotes is probability of winning, and ci > 0 contestant is marginal
cost of e¤ort. Without loss of generality, the value of the prize will be normalized to
V = 1. Following Rosen (1986), we will assume that
pi(x1; x2) =
8><>:
ih(xi)
1h(x1) + 2h(x2)
if x1 + x2 > 0
i=(1 + 2) if x1 + x2 = 0,
(2)
where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 are parameters, while h : R+ ! R+ is a continuous function
that is twice continuously di¤erentiable at positive bid levels, with h(0) = 0, h0 > 0,
and h00  0.15 It will also be assumed that the curvature of the production function
14See also the extensions by Van Zandt and Vives (2007) and Hagenbach et al. (2014).
15Our assumption of a concave production function is motivated by the fact that the existence and
uniqueness of Bayesian equilibrium in probabilistic contests with incomplete information has been
studied, up to this point, predominantly for this case, so that relaxing that assumption would take
us away from the main focus of this paper. In contrast, the extension to player-specic production
functions is easily feasible, yet does not yield additional insights.
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h, i.e.,   (h) = inff  1 jh convexg is well-dened.16
This set-up includes, as an important special case, the example of the biased
Tullock contest (Tullock, 1975; Leininger, 1993; Clark and Riis, 1998), where the
production function is given by h(z) = hTUL(z; r)  zr for an arbitrary parameter
r 2 (0; 1]. In the Tullock case, (hTUL) = 1=r. The lottery contest corresponds to the
case r = 1, and hence  = 1.
Each player i 2 f1; 2g is privately informed about her marginal cost ci. It is
commonly known, however, that player is type is drawn ex-ante, independently across
players, from a given probability distribution over the nite set Ci = fc1i ; :::; cKii g,
where Ki  1. The ex-ante probability of type cki is denoted by qki  qi(cki ), for
k = 1; :::; Ki, where probabilities sum up to one, i.e., q1i + :::+ q
Ki
i = 1. Without loss
of generality, we assume that all possible type realizations have a positive probability,
i.e., qki > 0 for any i 2 f1; 2g and any k 2 f1; :::; Kig. Moreover, types will be ordered
such that
ci  c1i < ::: < cKii  ci (i 2 f1; 2g): (3)
Thus, ci denotes the most e¢ cient, or strongest type of player i, whereas ci denotes
the least e¢ cient, or weakest type of player i.17
A bid schedule for player i 2 f1; 2g is an arbitrary function i : Ci ! R+. Denote
by Xi the set of is bid schedules. A pair of bid schedules 
 = (1; 

2) 2 X1  X2
is a Bayesian equilibrium if, for any type ci 2 Ci of any player i 2 f1; 2g, the e¤ort
16The curvature (h) corresponds to the smallest  for which the production function h is -convex
(cf., e.g., Anderson and Renault, 2003). For general background on generalized concavity, see Caplin
and Nalebu¤ (1991a, 1991b).
17Our set-up is isomorphic to a model in which costs are commonly known but valuations are
private information for the contestants (e.g., Hurley and Shogren, 1998b). This can be seen by
normalizing payo¤ functions in the agent-normal form of the Bayesian contest game. Further,
we conjecture that our results extend to the case of continuous type spaces (Fey, 2008; Ryvkin,
2010; Wasser, 2013a, 2013b; Ewerhart, 2014), yet we also suspect that the technical complications
necessary would not be rewarded by additional insights.
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level xi = 

i (ci) maximizes type cis expected payo¤ Ecj [i(xi; 

j(cj); ci)], where
Ecj [:] denotes the expectation over the realizations of cj 2 Cj, with j 6= i. Following
Schoonbeek and Winkel (2006), a type ci 2 Ci that chooses an equilibrium e¤ort
i (ci) > 0 (

i (ci) = 0) will be called active (inactive). The discontinuity of the payo¤
functions at the origin implies that, at any Bayesian equilibrium, both players are
necessarily active with positive probability.18 By the same token, at least one player
will have to be active with probability one. We will make use of the following existing
result.
Lemma 1. The contest stage has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.19
Proof. See Appendix B. 
In the special cases of complete and one-sided incomplete information, the following
notation will be used. When it is commonly known that, for i 2 f1; 2g, player is
type is ci = ci for some c

i 2 Ci, then is equilibrium strategy will be written as
xi = x

i (c

1; c

2). Further, when it is commonly known that player is type is ci = c
#
i
for some c#i 2 Ci, while player js type, with j 6= i, is uncertain, then equilibrium
strategies will be written as x#i = x
#
i (c
#
i ) for player i and as 
#
j = 
#
j (:; c
#
i ) for player
j, so that #j (cj; c
#
i ) is type cjs equilibrium e¤ort.
2.2 The revelation stage
At a stage preceding the contest, players are given the opportunity to simultane-
ously and independently disclose their marginal costs of e¤ort to their respective
18To see this, suppose that one player is always inactive. Then, any su¢ ciently small positive bid
is a better response than the zero bid, but any positive bid is suboptimal. Hence, there is no best
response if one player is always inactive.
19Lemma 1 extends to mixed strategies. Indeed, since each player is active with positive proba-
bility, and payo¤s functions are own-bid l.s.c. at the origin, expected payo¤s against the opponents
equilibrium strategy are strictly concave over R+, so that it is suboptimal to randomize strictly.
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opponent.20 Following the Bayesian persuasion approach, it is assumed that private
information cannot be misrepresented (in the sense of providing evidence for being
of another type). Further, the decision to self-disclose does not lead to any direct
costs.21 Let Si  Ci denote the set of types of player i 2 f1; 2g that choose to disclose
their private information.
A belief about player i is a mapping i : Ci ! [0; 1] such that
PKi
k=1 i(c
k
i ) = 1. We
denote by (Ci) the set of all beliefs about i. Beliefs are updated in response to the
observation of veriable information. Consequently, there are three basic scenarios
for each contestant i 2 f1; 2g.
(i) Suppose rst that player i discloses ci 2 Ci. Then, player i is believed to be of
type ci with probability one, i.e., i(ci) = 1.
(ii) Next, suppose that player i does not disclose her type, and that player is decision
to not disclose is a possibility on the equilibrium path, i.e., CinSi 6= ?. Then, ci is
expected to be in the set-theoretic complement of Si. Hence, by Bayesrule,
i(ci) =
8><>: qi(ci)=
P
c0i2CinSi qi(c
0
i) if ci 2 CinSi
0 if ci 2 Si.
(4)
(iii) Finally, suppose that player i does not disclose her type, and that is decision to
not disclose is an o¤-equilibrium event, i.e., CinSi = ?. Then, the belief about player
i may be specied as an arbitrary probability distribution i = 
0
i over Ci.
22
20Thus, the revelation stage o¤ers a binary decision for each type. However, our main result
continues to hold provided that contestants message correspondences each contain an evidence
base (Hagenbach et al., 2014). For example, the disclosure decision may alternatively establish an
upper bound for the favorites cost parameter and a lower bound for the underdogs cost parameter,
respectively.
21Introducing costs for disclosing information would not change our conclusions, provided those
are not too large compared to the benets of self-disclosure identied below.
22O¤-equilibrium beliefs in the fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium will be specied below
by giving full weight to the respective worst-case type (Seidman and Winter, 1997; Hagenbach et
12
Since the Bayesian equilibrium at the contest stage is unique, the expected contin-
uation payo¤ for any type ci 2 Ci with i 2 f1; 2g from the contest stage is well-dened
for any given pair of beliefs (1; 2) 2 (C1)(C2) such that i(ci) > 0. A perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, in reduced form, of the contest with pre-play communication
is therefore composed of sets S1  C1 and S2  C2 of revealing types, and o¤-
equilibrium beliefs 0i 2 (Ci) for any i 2 f1; 2g with Si = Ci, such that (i) for each
type ci 2 Si, the expected continuation payo¤ from self-disclosure weakly exceeds any
expected payo¤ that ci could realize from not disclosing and subsequently choosing
an arbitrary bid xi  0, and such that (ii) for each type ci 2 CinSi, the expected con-
tinuation payo¤ from non-disclosure weakly exceeds the expected continuation payo¤
from self-disclosure.23
3. The unraveling theorem
3.1 Unfair contests
A probabilistic contest of either complete or incomplete information will be called
unfair when there is one player that is active with probability one and that, provided
that the other player is also active with probability one, is interim always more likely
to win than the other player.
To formulate conditions on the primitives of the model that ensure that a contest
is unfair regardless of disclosure decisions, we introduce the following parameters. To
start with, let the ratio  = c2=c1 denote player 1s lowest relative resolve, where the
al., 2014). In the present setting, the worst-case type of the favorite is the least e¢ cient type, c1,
whereas the worst-case type of the underdog is the most e¢ cient type, c2. See also the discussion
following Theorem 1.
23Type-dependent signal spaces and continuous strategy sets preclude a direct reference to the
standard denition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a multi-stage game with observable actions
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 331). Otherwise, however, the denition is standard. Note also that
we restrict attention to pure strategies at the revelation stage. This is for expositional reasons only.
Our main result (Theorem 1 below) holds likewise when players may use randomized strategies at
the revelation stage.
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terminology is adapted from Hurley and Shogren (1998a, 1998b). E.g., if player 1
is interim always more e¢ cient than player 2, then  strictly exceeds one and corre-
sponds to the worst-case cost advantage of player 1 compared to player 2. Second,
we will denote by i =
p
ci=ci the predictability of player is marginal cost, where
i 2 f1; 2g. Thus, a predictability equal to one (strictly lower than one) for a player
corresponds to complete information (incomplete information) about her type. Fi-
nally, the parameter  = 2=1 will be referred to as the net bias of the contest
technology. For example, a net bias equal to one (strictly below one, strictly above
one) corresponds to a contest technology that is unbiased (biased against player 2,
biased against player 1).
The following assumption will be imposed throughout the analysis.
Assumption 1.  < (1; 2; ; )  1+22 22 1  b(; ), where
b(; ) =
8><>:  if   11= if  > 1: (5)
Intuitively, with Assumption 1 in place, player 1 is in a quite strong position relative
to player 2. As will be shown below, this implies that the contest, even though of
incomplete information, is structurally similar to the complete-information contest
considered by Dixit (1987). We also remark that the specic form of the inequality
has been derived from the proof of Lemma 2 below and thus constitutes a su¢ cient
but not necessary condition for the contest to be unfair.24
The comparative statics of  is straightforward. Indeed, it can be readily ver-
ied that, when positive, (1; 2; ; ) is strictly increasing in each of the three
parameters 1, 2, and , as well as monotone declining in . Thus, the assumption
24For a discussion of what happens when Assumption 1 is dropped, see the end of this section.
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of unfairness is more likely to hold when the net bias discriminates more strongly
against player 2, when marginal costs are more predictable, when player 1s lowest
relative resolve is larger, or when the production function has a lower curvature. In
particular, the comparative statics with respect to 1, 2, and  should convince the
reader that, if Assumption 1 holds for a given contest, changes to the information
structure caused by pre-play disclosure decisions can never invalidate Assumption 1.25
One can also check that the case of a biased contest with ex-ante symmetric type
distributions (i.e., c1 = c2  c1 = c2), as discussed, e.g., by Drugov and Ryvkin
(2017), is consistent with Assumption 1.26 In particular, in the limit case of complete
information and symmetric costs (i.e., c1 = c1 = c2 = c2), Assumption 1 just says
that the contest technology is biased against player 2 (i.e., 2 < 1).
Returning to the general case, we make the following observation that is crucial
for our analysis.
Lemma 2. (Underdog and favorite)
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, (i) all types of player 1 are active; and
(ii), provided that all types of player 2 are active as well, p1(

1(c1); 

2(c2)) >
1
2
>
p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2)) for any c1 2 C1 and c2 2 C2.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Thus, Assumption 1 implies that player 1 is active with probability one. Moreover,
provided that player 2 is likewise active with probability one, player 1 is interim,
i.e., for any realization of types c1 and c2, more likely to win than player 2.27 In
25This point will be discussed more formally in the proof of Lemma 2 below.
26Indeed, in this case,  = (3 2)
2
2  , with   1 = 2 =
p
. For example, for  = 0:8, we get
 = 0:21.
27The activity of all types of player 2 is actually needed. Intuitively, an inactive type of player 2
may lower the marginal incentives of player 1, and may thereby invalidate the conclusion of Lemma
2(ii).
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other words, Assumption 1 ensures that the contest stage is unfair regardless of the
disclosure decisions taken by the contestants at the revelation stage. Lemma 2 is
proven by the combination of several inequalities, all of which are derived from the
rst-order conditions necessary for playersbid schedules to be in equilibrium. Given
this result, we henceforth will refer to player 1 as the favorite and to player 2 as the
underdog.
3.2 Main result
We will use the term full revelation to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
or the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome, in which all types disclose their private
information. The main result of the present paper is the following.
Theorem 1. (Disclosure principle)
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome in the incomplete-information contest with pre-play communica-
tion.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Theorem 1 states that the strong-form disclosure principle applies to any contest that
satises Assumption 1. Note that no activity conditions have been imposed. This is
noteworthy because, in general, corner solutions are known to be consistent with the
existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with no revelation of private information
(Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990, Ex. 4). In our framework, however, this problem cannot
occur.
An overview discussion of the proof of Theorem 1 will be provided in the next
section. In fact, the proof may be of some interest because it examines the before-
mentioned incentives for interim voluntary disclosure, identifying also quite intuitive
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e¤ects such as a benecial self-disclosure for the weakest type of the underdog, as
well as strategies of intimidation (or discouragement) for the strongest type of the
favorite. We also check that full revelation is indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.28
It is instructive to compare Theorem 1 with the case of auctions with interdepen-
dent valuations, where the incentives to reveal a private signal are typically strongest
at the bottom of the signal support (Benoît and Dubra, 2006). In both cases, volun-
tary disclosure aims at reducing the opponents incentives for bidding too aggressively.
However, unlike the auction setting, the contest may induce also the most optimistic
types to reveal their private information. Indeed, as Proposition 2 below will show,
this is denitely so for the type at the top of the signal support, corresponding to the
strongest type of the favorite.
Hagenbach et al. (2014) identied necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the exis-
tence of a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremalo¤-equilibrium beliefs
that implements a given Nash equilibrium action prole on and o¤ the equilibrium
path. They assumed that a player that surprises her opponent by not revealing her
type is deemed to be the worst-case type, i.e., the type that no other type would like
to masquerade as. In our setting, the worst-case type is either the most e¢ cient type
of the underdog, or the least e¢ cient type of the favorite. Thus, the o¤-equilibrium
beliefs they constructed correspond precisely to those that will be used below to estab-
lish the equilibrium property.29 Theorem 1 complements the analysis of Hagenbach et
al. (2014) by providing conditions su¢ cient for the uniqueness of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome in the special case of probabilistic all-pay contests.
28In principle, to reveal all private information, it su¢ ces that, for each player, all but one type
disclose their private information. The residual type is then indi¤erent between concealing or re-
vealing her information. As a result, the uniqueness claim to be made concerns only the outcome,
rather than the equilibrium.
29In particular, given our assumption of nite type spaces, full revelation can be seen to satisfy
the consistency property of a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) in our framework.
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We conclude this section by showing that the conclusion of Theorem 1 need not
hold when Assumption 1 is dropped.
Example 1.30 (Failure of the strong-form disclosure principle) In the ex-ante
symmetric set-up specied in Table I, neither type benets from unilateral disclosure.
In this particular case, this is so even though the self-disclosure by the strong type
c1 = c
1
1 marginalizes the weak type c2 = c
2
2 of the opponent.
Table I. Failure of the strong disclosure principle.
Thus, in a contest that is not unfair, all types concealing their private information
may well be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
4. Understanding the unraveling result
This section discusses the mechanics underlying Theorem 1. We start by deriving ba-
sic monotonicity properties of playersbest-response mappings. Then, the disclosure
decision of the weakest type of the underdog is dealt with. Finally, we consider the
disclosure decision of the strongest type of the favorite.
30All the numerical examples in this paper are based on the unbiased lottery contest. Moreover,
to exclude the possibility of rounding errors in the rst-order conditions, we have double-checked
any close case using a working precision of as much as 256 decimal digits.
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4.1 Lattice-theoretic framework
Given two bid schedules i;bi 2 Xi, we write i i bi when i(ci)  bi(ci) holds for
any ci 2 Ci. Thus, (Xi;i) is the set of bid schedules equipped with the product
order.31 As usual, we will write i i bi if i i bi and there is ci 2 Ci such that
i(ci) > bi(ci). Moreover, the subscript i in i and i will be dropped whenever there
is no risk of ambiguity.
Denote by Xj  Xj the set of bid schedules j for player j 2 f1; 2g that admit,
for any type ci 2 Ci of player i 6= j, a unique maximizer xi  ei(j; ci) 2 R+ of the
expected payo¤ function xi 7! Ecj [i(xi; j(cj); ci)]. Given j 2 Xj , the bid schedule
i(j) =
ei(j; ) : Ci ! R+ will be called the best-response bid schedule against j.
In Appendix A, it is shown that, for any j 2 Xj , the best-response bid schedule
i(j) is weakly declining in the type, and strictly so at positive bid levels.
The mapping i : X

j ! Xi that maps a given bid schedule j of player j to
player is best-response bid schedule against j will be referred to as player is best-
response mapping. In the case of complete information, the best-response mapping
satises monotonicity properties only on a strict subset of the opponents strategy
space.32 This is likewise so in the case of incomplete information. We will say that
player 1s domain condition holds at (2; c1) 2 X2  C1 if (i) e1(2; c1) > 0, and
(ii) p1(e1(2; c1); 2(c2)) > 12 for any c2 2 C2. Thus, player 1s domain condition at
(2; c1) requires that type c1s best-response bid against 2 is interior, and wins with
a probability strictly exceeding one half against any of player 2s types. Similarly, we
will say that player 2s domain condition holds at (b1; c2) 2 X1 C2 if (i) e2(b1; c2) >
0, and (ii) p2(b1(c1); e2(b1; c2)) < 12 for any c1 2 C1. Thus, player 2s domain condition
at (b1; c1) requires that type c2s best-response bid against b1 is interior, and wins
31In fact, (Xi;i) is a lattice, yet this property will not be used below.
32See Dixit (1987). See also Gama and Rietzke (2017), who o¤er a lattice-theoretic discussion of
the complete-information set-up.
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with a probability strictly below one half against any of player 1s types. Using these
denitions, we obtain the following useful result.
Lemma 3. (Strict monotonicity of best-response mappings)
(i) Let 2;b2 2 X2 with 2  b2, and let c1 2 C1. If player 1s domain condition holds
at (2; c1), then e1(2; c1) > e1(b2; c1). In particular, if player 1s domain condition
holds at (2; c1) for every c1 2 C1, then 1(2)  1(b2).
(ii) Let 1;b1 2 X1 with 1  b1, and let c2 2 C2. If player 2s domain condition
holds at (b1; c2), then e2(1; c2) < e2(b1; c2). In particular, if player 2s domain
condition holds at (b1; c2) for every c2 2 C2, then 2(1)  2(b1).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This lemma shows that the domain conditions are su¢ cient to ensure that a types
best-response bid and a players best-response bid schedule, respectively, move in a
strictly monotone way to changes in the opponents bid schedule. For example, in
the case of player 1, the best-response bid of type c1 will strictly rise in response
to an increase of player 2s bid schedule. If player 1s domain condition holds at
all of her types, then we get a strict order relation even between the best-response
bid schedules. Similar comparative statics properties hold for player 2, whose best-
response mapping is, however, strictly declining under the assumptions of Lemma
3. In sum, the contest with two-sided incomplete information exhibits, subject to
domain conditions, comparative statics properties analogous to those of the complete-
information contest.
4.2 Benets of self-disclosure for the underdog
In this subsection, we study the incentives of the weakest type of the underdog to dis-
close her type, given a candidate equilibrium in which all types conceal their informa-
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tion. Consider, consequently, a contest with incomplete information in which player
2 has at least two possible type realizations. Let  = (1; 

2) denote the Bayesian
equilibrium at the contest stage. For the weakest type of the underdog c2, the prob-
ability of winning and the expected payo¤ are given by p2 = Ec1 [p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2))]
and 2 = Ec1 [2(

1(c1); 

2(c2); c2)], respectively. Consider, next, the Bayesian equi-
librium (#1 ; x
#
2 ) in the contest with one-sided incomplete information that results
when the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type. Then, type c2s prob-
ability of winning and expected payo¤ are given by p#2 = Ec1 [p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 )] and
#2 = Ec1 [2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ; c2)], respectively. The following result summarizes the com-
parative statics of the equilibrium at the contest stage with respect to the disclosure
decision by the weakest type of the underdog.
Proposition 1. (Self-disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog)
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and that the underdog has at least two possible type
realizations. Then, a unilateral disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog, c2,
(i) induces type c2 to strictly raise her e¤ort, i.e., x
#
2 > 

2(c2);
(ii) strictly raises type c2s interim probability of winning, i.e., p
#
2 > p

2 (even against
any given type of player 1); and
(iii) strictly raises type c2s expected payo¤, i.e., 
#
2 > 

2.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Thus, after revealing her relative weakness, the weakest type of the underdog behaves
as if gaining condence. She bids more aggressively and wins with a strictly higher
probability. Moreover, the disclosure is always strictly benecial for her. In the
proof of the unraveling result, we will actually need only part (iii) of Proposition 1.
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However, as will become clear, parts (i) and (ii) are crucial steps that need to be
made in order to derive part (iii).
Note that the conclusions of Proposition 1 are immediate for any type of the
underdog that is inactive in . Indeed, disclosure is the only way for such types
to ensure an active participation, a positive probability of winning, and a positive
expected payo¤. Thus, Proposition 1 shows that the weakest type of the underdog
has an incentive to disclose her type even when she foresees herself being active after
concealment.
Figure 2. A lattice-theoretic argument.
The fact that the weakest type of the underdog raises her e¤ort after self-disclosure
may be unexpected. To understand this point, suppose that, instead of strictly raising
her e¤ort, the weakest type of the underdog were to weakly lower her e¤ort after
disclosure, i.e., x#2  2(c2), as shown in the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure
2. Consider now the at bid schedule  2(x
#
2 ) 2 X2 that prescribes an e¤ort of x#2
for each type c2 2 C2 of the underdog. Then, since there are at least two types for
the underdog, and since the equilibrium bid schedule 2 is strictly declining, we get
2   2(x#2 ). From the strict monotonicity of player 1s best-response mapping, after
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checking domain conditions, we therefore obtain 1 = 1(

2)  1( 2(x#2 )) = #1 , as
shown in the diagram on the left-hand side of Figure 2. Applying now the strictly
declining best-response mapping of the weakest type of the underdog, checking also
here the domain condition, we arrive at 2(c2) = e2(1; c2) < e2(#1 ; c2) = x#2 , which
yields the desired contradiction. Thus, the weakest type of the underdog indeed gains
in condence after self-disclosure.
Based upon this fact, it can be shown that self-disclosure strictly raises also the
probability of winning for the weakest type of the underdog. Ultimately, this is a
consequence of what we call the Stackelberg monotonicity of the complete-information
model. By this, we mean the fact that an increase of player is bid, subject to an
optimal response by the opponent j, always raises player is winning probability (and
strictly so in the interior). Intuitively, a higher e¤ort is rewarded in terms of higher
winning probabilities.33 Applied to the present situation, this says that a Stackelberg-
leading player 2 that raises her bid from 2(c2) to x
#
2 strictly increases her probability
of winning. But type c2s probability of winning with her bid 

2(c2) in the Stackelberg
setting is already strictly higher than in the Bayesian equilibrium under two-sided
incomplete information, because player 1s best-response bid schedule against the
leaders bid 2(c2) is strictly lower than 

1 in the product order. Combining these
two insights, it follows that indeed, the probability of winning for the weakest type
of the underdog rises strictly subsequent to self-disclosure. In fact, this is so even for
any given type of the favorite.
Finally, we check that the weakest type of the underdog has a strict incentive to
disclose her private information. The proof we managed to come up with exploits, in
the spirit of the envelope theorem, type c2s rst-order condition in order to rewrite
33This property, for which we did not nd a suitable reference, may be seen as an analogue of
Dixits (1987, Eq. 8) precommitment result. However, in contrast to that result, the Stackelberg
monotonicity property holds regardless of contestantsrelative strengths.
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her expected payo¤ from the contest as a monotone function of ex-post winning
probabilities and bids. Given parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, this su¢ ces to prove
the claim. Unfortunately, however, developing a simple intuition for part (iii) seems
to be more intricate.
Through repeated application of Proposition 1, the underdogs side of the contest
equilibrium is seen to unravel. Indeed, all types of the underdog except the worst-case
type will, when in the position of the weakest type that is foreseen to conceal, nd
it strictly optimal to voluntarily disclose their private information. Thus, incomplete
information is e¤ectively one-sided in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
4.3 Benets of self-disclosure for the favorite
From the previous section, we know that, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the
type of the underdog is public information at the contest stage. Let c#2 denote the
commonly known cost type of the underdog. Given this setting with one-sided in-
complete information, we will study the incentive of the strongest type of the favorite
to disclose her private information to the underdog.
If type c1 decides to conceal her private information, then the ensuing contest is
of one-sided incomplete information, with equilibrium e¤orts #1 (c1)  #1 (c1; c#2 ) and
x#2  x#2 (c#2 ). Type c1s probability of winning and expected payo¤ are consequently
given by p#1 = p1(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) and 
#
1 = 1(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ; c1), respectively. If, however,
type c1 decides to disclose her private information, then the ensuing contest is of com-
plete information, with equilibrium e¤orts xi  xi (c1; c#2 ), for i = 1; 2. In that case,
type c1s probability of winning and expected payo¤ are given by p

1 = p1(x

1; x

2) and
1 = 1(x

1; x

2; c1), respectively. The following result summarizes the comparative
statics of the one-sided incomplete-information contest with respect to a revelation
by the strongest type of the favorite.
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Proposition 2. (Self-disclosure by the strongest type of the favorite)
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that the type of the underdog is public informa-
tion, whereas the favorite has at least two possible type realizations. Then, a unilateral
disclosure by the strongest type of the favorite, c1,
(i) induces the underdog to strictly lower her e¤ort, i.e., x2 < x
#
2 ;
(ii) allows type c1 to strictly lower her e¤ort, i.e., x

1 < 
#
1 (c1);
(iii) strictly raises type c1s probability of winning, i.e., p

1 > p
#
1 ; and
(iv) strictly raises type c1s expected payo¤, i.e., 

1 > 
#
1 .
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Thus, if the type of the underdog is public, then the self-revelation by the strongest
type of the favorite discourages the underdog. As a result, the strongest type of the
favorite exerts a lower e¤ort, but still wins with higher probability. Clearly then, she
nds it strictly optimal to reveal her private information to the underdog. The proof
of Proposition 2 employs the same methods that have been used before. However,
given that informational incompleteness is one-sided, the argument is of course much
simpler in this case.34
As shown in the Appendix, an iterated application of Proposition 2 implies that
also the favorites side unravels. Thus, in the presence of Assumption 1, full revelation
is the only outcome consistent with the assumption of perfect Bayesian rationality.
But, as already discussed, disclosure by all types of both players is indeed a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium of the contest with pre-play communication, which then
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
34Part (ii) of Proposition 2 can actually be shown to hold also in the case of two-sided incomplete
information, using an argument similar to the one used for Proposition 1. Beyond this observation,
however, the analogy is incomplete. In fact, we conjecture that parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2
do not generalize to a setting with two-sided incomplete information.
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5. Nonmonotone reactions to disclosure
This section documents two additional e¤ects, intuitively corresponding to domi-
nantand deant reactions, that naturally arise in the study of the comparative
statics of the Bayesian equilibrium at the contest stage with respect to changes in the
information structure. On a more technical level, this will also allow us to clarify the
relationship between the present analysis and the recent contribution of Monaco and
Sabarwal (2016).
5.1 Equilibrium responses to the underdogs self-disclosure
While self-disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog tends to have an overall
moderating e¤ect on the favorite, some types of the favorite may actually respond by
becoming more aggressive.
Example 2. (Dominant reaction) Consider the set-up specied in Table II. As
can be seen, after the self-disclosure by type c2 = c22 of the underdog, the weak type
c1 = c
2
1 of the favorite raises her e¤ort.
Table II. Equilibrium bids before and after the underdogs self-disclosure.
Example 2 shows that the self-disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog need not
cause a generally soothing shift in the favorites bid schedule. Indeed, in response to
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learning that the underdog is weak, only the strong type of the favorite decreases her
bid, whereas the weak type of the favorite raises her bid, as if being challenged. For
intuition, note that there are two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, following
the self-disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog, the favorites belief regarding
the underdogs type collapses and henceforth assigns probability one to the weakest
type of the underdog. Clearly, this induces all of the favorites types to lower their
respective bids. On the other hand, the weakest type of the underdog will raise her
bid after having disclosed her type, which induces all of the favorites types to likewise
raise their respective bids. Since the two e¤ects have opposite signs, the overall e¤ect
of the underdogs self-disclosure on the bid of a given type of the favorite is, in general,
ambiguous.
Despite this exibility, the model does impose some structure of the favorites
reaction. First, not all types of the favorite may simultaneously raise their bids in
response to the self-disclosure by the weakest type of the underdog. Indeed, this would
be incompatible with our earlier conclusion that the weakest type of the underdog
necessarily raises her bid. Second, even a dominant reaction of the favorite will never
be strong enough to press the probability of winning for the weakest type of the
underdog weakly below her probability of winning under concealment.
5.2 Equilibrium responses to the favorites self-disclosure
The following example demonstrates that, in analogy to the case just considered,
a type of the underdog may actually raise her e¤ort after the favorites attempt to
discourage her.
Example 3. (Deant reaction) Consider the set-up specied in Table III. It
can be seen that, in response to the favorites attempt to discourage the underdog,
only the two weaker types of the underdog lower their respective e¤orts, whereas the
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strongest type of the underdog actually raises her e¤ort.
Table III. Equilibrium bids before and after the favorites self-disclosure.
In fact, the example illustrates again another possibility, seen before in a symmetric
environment, viz. that a type of the underdog may become so discouraged that she
decides to exert zero e¤ort.35
5.3 Relationship to Monaco and Sabarwal (2016)
Monaco and Sabarwal (2016) introduced an interesting new class of games that they
referred to as parameterized games of strategic heterogeneity. For the precise deni-
tion, we refer the reader to the original paper. Very roughly, however, in such games,
strategy spaces are lattices and payo¤ functions allow for strategic complements and
substitutes at the same time. One can check that, under suitable constraints on
bids, the incomplete-information contests considered in the present paper are indeed
parameterized games of strategic heterogeneity. Rather unexpectedly, however, we
found that the contraction-mapping approach of Monaco and Sabarwal (2016, Th. 5)
need not go through when the contest is too unbalanced. The problem is that, as
35This possibility is reminiscent of the drop-out identied by Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010).
However, in their setting, intimidation is caused by the presence of additional players, whereas in
our setting, intimidation is caused by disclosed information.
28
recently noted by Wärneryd (2016) in a di¤erent context, the best-response iteration
in a su¢ ciently asymmetric contest need not be a contraction. Figure 1 above illus-
trates this fact for the case of complete information, but the situation is quite similar
under incomplete information.36
6. A commitment problem
While self-disclosure is always individually rational for some type of some player,
other types of the same player might subsequently su¤er from an increased level of
competition. It turns out that this is indeed feasible. More specically, it will be
shown in this section that the unraveling may lead to higher ex-ante levels of rent
dissipation for both players and to a lower ex-ante probability of winning for the
underdog. In fact, the unraveling may be strictly undesirable for both contestants.
To illustrate this point, we will compare the equilibrium scenario of full revelation
(FR) with the hypothetical benchmark of mandatory concealment (MC). Let CFR =
E[c1x

1(c1; c2)+c2x

2(c1; c2)] and C
MC = E[c1

1(c1)+c2

2(c2)], respectively, denote to-
tal expected costs under full revelation and under mandatory concealment.37 Further,
for i 2 f1; 2g, let pFRi = E [pi(x1(c1; c2); x2(c1; c2))] and pMCi = E [pi(1(c1); 2(c2))] de-
note player is ex-ante probability of winning under full revelation and under manda-
tory concealment. Finally, likewise for i 2 f1; 2g, let FRi = pFRi   E[cixi (c1; c2)]
and MCi = p
MC
i   Eci [cii (ci)] denote player is ex-ante expected payo¤ under full
revelation and mandatory concealment. A specic setting that allows to draw some
clear-cut conclusions is assumed in the following result.
36To see this for Example 2, let 1(2) = 1( 2(2(c2))) denote player 1s best-response bid
schedule against  2(2(c2)), where 2 2 X2 . Monaco and Sabarwal (2016, Th. 5) required that
1(
b2)  1, where b2 = 2(b1) and b1 = 1(2). A numerical computation shows that b1(c1) =
0:1016, b1(c1) = 0:0715, and b2(c2) = 0:0194. As a result, 1(b2)(c1) = 0:4208 > 0:1592 = 1(c1) and
1(
b2)(c1) = 0:2919 > 0:1042 = 1(c1). Thus, 1(b2)  1, in conict with the required condition.
37E[:] = Ec1;c2 [:] denotes the ex-ante expectation.
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Proposition 3. (Commitment problem)
Consider an unbiased lottery contest satisfying Assumption 1. Suppose that the type of
the favorite is public information, whereas the underdog has at least two possible type
realizations. Assume also that, under mandatory concealment, all types are active.
Then,
(i) CFR > CMC (in both cases, expected costs split evenly between the players);38
(ii) the underdogs (the favorites) ex-ante probability of winning is strictly lower
(strictly higher) under full revelation than under mandatory concealment, i.e., pFR2 <
pMC2 ( p
FR
1 > p
MC
1 ); and
(iii) the ex-ante payo¤ for the underdog is strictly lower under full revelation than
under mandatory concealment, i.e., FR2 < 
MC
2 .
39
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The result above shows that the option to disclose private information may be undesir-
able for a contestant. Intuitively, there is an externality that the disclosing marginal
type imposes upon the silent submarginal types. The externality is a virtual one only,
because two type realizations of the same contestant never coexist. Notwithstanding,
the inability to commit leads to a situation in which the privately informed player
loses in expected terms by the unraveling.
The following example illustrates the possibility that the unraveling may actually
be ex-ante undesirable for both contestants.
38Thus, the e¤ort of the favorite is strictly higher under full revelation than under mandatory
concealment. The expected e¤ort of the underdog, however, may either rise or fall, depending on
parameters.
39The payo¤ comparison for the favorite is ambiguous, i.e., depending on parameters, it may be
that FR1  MC1 , or as in Example 4 below, that FR1 < MC1 .
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Example 4. (Disclosure trap) The setting specied in Table IV satises the
assumptions of Proposition 3, and hence, illustrates the conclusions of the proposition.
More importantly, it can be seen that the unraveling leads the contestants into a
strictly Pareto inferior outcome.
Table IV. Equilibrium bids under full revelation and mandatory concealment.
Thus, in contrast to the more common situation in which the receiver in a persuasion
game, such as an employer, a consumer, or a health insurer, tends to benet from the
unraveling, sometimes even unduly so, this need not be the case in a contest.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have identied general conditions under which a probabilistic contest
with pre-play communication admits full disclosure as the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome. Interestingly, our main result is just the opposite of the cor-
responding nding for the all-pay auction (Kovenock et al., 2015). Moreover, given
that the usual assumptions for the uniqueness of the fully revealing equilibrium out-
come (Milgrom, 1981; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Seidman and Winter, 1997; Van
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Zandt and Vives, 2007) fail to hold for contests, our results mean an extension of
existing theory. In particular, the strong-form disclosure principle is more general
than previously perceived.40
Regarding methods, we have extended the existing lattice-theoretic approach for
the analysis of the comparative statics of equilibria in games of strategic heterogeneity
(Monaco and Sabarwal, 2016). Furthermore, we have developed an improved version
of Jensens inequality, which might be of independent interest.
Our analysis took us naturally to a formalization of several intuitive concepts for
which, to our knowledge, a exible and all-encompassing framework in the realm of
contest theory has been lacking so far. These concepts include strategic attempts
of individual types to either moderate or discourage an opponent through pre-play
communication of veriable information, as well as the possibility of seemingly ir-
rational, dominantor deant, reactions to such attempts. Clearly, these latter
ndings are unexpected given the absence of behavioral elements in our framework.
Therefore, the further analysis of such e¤ects appears to us as a valuable route for
future research.41
40Theorem 1 continues to hold when the revelation stage is replaced by a sequential-move model in
which the disclosure decision is made rst by the favorite. But also in the case where the underdog
moves rst, we have found (by a denite result for the lottery contest, and an extensive numerical
search for more general technologies) that full revelation remains the unique perfect Bayesian equi-
librium outcome. Thus, even if disclosure decisions are made sequentially, it does not seem possible
for the players to escape the logic of the unraveling result.
41For instance, our numerical exercises suggest that only the weakest types of the favorite may
exhibit dominant reactions, and that only the strongest types of the underdog may exhibit deant
reactions.
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Appendix A: Auxiliary results
In this Appendix, we state and prove a number of auxiliary results. Lemma A.1 col-
lects some properties of a transformation introduced by Wärneryd (2003).42 Lemma
A.2 establishes a basic monotonicity property of the best-response bid schedule.
Lemma A.3 provides bounds on the bid distributions. Lemma A.4 establishes the
Stackelberg monotonicity property of the complete-information contest. Finally,
Lemma A.5 o¤ers an extension of Jensens inequality.
Lemma A.1 (Wärneryds transformation)
Let (z) = h(z)=h0(z), for any z > 0. Then,
(i) limz&0 (z) = 0,
(ii) 1  0  , and
(iii) (d lnh)=(d ln) = 1=0.
Proof. (i) By assumption, h is di¤erentiable in the interior of the strategy space,
with h0 positive and declining. Hence, limz!0 h0(z) 2 (0;1]. Moreover, by continuity,
limz!0 h(z) = 0. The claim follows. (ii) Note rst that 0 = 1   (hh00=(h0)2)  1 by
the concavity of h. To see that 0  , take some  >  such that h is convex. Then,
in the interior of the strategy space,
(  1)h 2 (h0)2 + h 1h00  0. (6)
Recall that   1. Hence,  > 1. Dividing (6) by h 2(h0)2 > 0, and rearranging,
one obtains 0  . Taking the limit ! , the claim follows. (iii) A straightforward
42See also Inderst et al. (2007).
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calculation shows that
d lnh(z)
d ln (z)
=

dh(z)
h(z)

d(z)
(z)

=
h0(z)dz
h(z)
 (z)
0(z)dz
=
1
0(z)
(z > 0), (7)
as claimed. This proves the lemma. 
Lemma A.2 (Best-response bid schedules)
Let j 2 Xj and ci;bci 2 Ci for i 6= j such that ci > bci. Then, ei(j; ci)  ei(j;bci),
where the inequality is strict if ei(j;bci) > 0.
Proof. Take an arbitrary bid schedule j 2 Xj of player j. The assertion is obvious
for ei(j; ci) = 0. Suppose instead that xi  ei(j; ci) > 0. Then, the necessary
rst-order condition for type ci implies
@Ecj [pi(xi; j(cj))]
@xi
= ci. (8)
We will show rst that player is marginal probability of winning, i.e., the left-hand
side of equation (8), is strictly declining in is bid. Indeed, because the best-response
bid ei(j; ci) exists, there is a type cj 2 Cj such that j(cj) > 0. A straightforward
calculation shows, therefore, that
@2Ecj [pi(xi; j(cj))]
@x2i
=
@
@xi
Ecj

ijh
0(xi)h(j(cj))
(ih(xi) + jh(j(cj)))
2

(9)
= Ecj
"
ijh(j(cj))

(ih(xi) + jh(j(cj)))h
00(xi)  2i(h0(xi))2
	
(ih(xi) + jh(j(cj)))
3
#
(10)
< 0, (11)
which proves the claim. There are now two cases. Assume rst that bxi > 0. For this
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case, it is claimed that bxi > xi. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that bxi  xi.
Then, since the marginal probability of winning for player i is strictly declining in is
bid,
bci = @Ecj [pi(bxi; j(cj))]
@xi
 @Ecj [pi(xi; j(cj))]
@xi
= ci, (12)
in conict with bci < ci. Hence, bxi > xi, as claimed. Assume next that bxi = 0, i.e.,
type bci nds it optimal to respond to j with a zero e¤ort. But then, clearly, strictly
higher marginal costs induce type ci to do the same, i.e., xi = 0. The lemma follows.

Lemma A.3 (Bounds on the bid distributions)
Let  = (1; 

2) be a Bayesian equilibrium in a contest such that both players are
active with probability one. Then, the following two inequalities hold:
ih(

i (ci)) 
1
i
 ih(i (ci)) +
1  i
i
 jh(j(cj)) (j 6= i) (13)
h(2(c2)) 
1b  h(1(c1)) (14)
Proof. Take an arbitrary type ci 2 Ci of player i. Since, by assumption, i (ci) > 0,
the necessary rst-order condition for type ci holds, i.e.,
Ecj

ijh
0(i (ci))h(

j(cj))
(ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj)))
2

  ci = 0, (15)
where j 6= i. To prove the rst claim, evaluate (15) at ci = ci. Then, making use of
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Lemma A.2 and the concavity of h, we get
ci = Ecj
"
ijh
0(i (ci))h(

j(cj))
(ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj)))
2


ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
2#
(16)
= Ecj
26664 ijh0(

i (ci))h(

j(cj))
(ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj)))
2


1 +
ih(

i (ci))  jh(i (ci))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
2
| {z }
monotone increasing in cj
37775 (17)
 Ecj

ijh
0(i (ci))h(

j(cj))
(ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj)))
2



ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
2
(18)
= Ecj

ijh
0(i (ci))h(

j(cj))
(ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj)))
2



h0(i (ci))
h0(i (ci))

| {z }
1


ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
2
(19)
 ci 

ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
2
. (20)
Dividing by ci > 0, and using i =
p
ci=ci, we obtain
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
ih(

i (ci)) + jh(

j(cj))
 1
i
. (21)
Inequality (13) follows. To prove the second claim, one multiplies type cis rst-order
condition (15) by (i (ci)), and subsequently takes expectations. This yields
Eci [ci(

i (ci))] = Ec1;c2

12h(

1(c1))h(

2(c2))
(1h(

1(c1)) + 2h(

2(c2)))
2

(i = 1; 2), (22)
where Ec1;c2 [:] denotes the ex-ante expectation. Exploiting the fact that equilibrium
bid schedules are monotone declining (by Lemma A.2), and that 0 > 0, this implies
c2(

2(c2))  Ec2 [c2(2(c2))] = Ec1 [c1(1(c1))]  c1(1(c1)), (23)
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or, using that (2(c2)) > 0,
(1(c1))
(2(c2))
 c2
c1
= . (24)
There are two cases. Assume rst that 1(c1)  2(c2). Then, using 0   (see
Lemma A.1), we obtain
ln

h(1(c1))
h(2(c2))

=
Z 1(c1)
2(c2)
d lnh(z) (25)
=
Z 1(c1)
2(c2)
d lnh(z)
d ln (z)
d ln (z) (26)
=
Z 1(c1)
2(c2)
1
0(z)
d ln (z) (27)
 1

Z 1(c1)
2(c2)
d ln (z) (28)
=
1

ln

(1(c1))
(2(c2))

. (29)
Using (24), this implies
h(2(c2)) 
1
1=
 h(1(c1)). (30)
Assume next that 1(c1) < 

2(c2). Then using 
0  1 (taken likewise from Lemma
A.1) delivers
ln

h(2(c2))
h(1(c1))

=
Z 2(c2)
1(c1)
d ln (z)
0(z)

Z 2(c2)
1(c1)
d ln (z) = ln

(2(c2))
(1(c1))

. (31)
Hence, in that case,
h(2(c2)) 
1

 h(1(c1)). (32)
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Thus, exploiting that   1,
h(2(c2))  h(1(c1)) max

1

;
1
1=

(33)
= h(1(c1))
8><>: 1= if   11=1= if  > 1. (34)
Clearly, this proves (14). 
Lemma A.4 (Stackelberg monotonicity)
Let x2 > bx2  0 and c1 2 C1 such that x1 = e1( 2(x2); c1) and bx1 = e1( 2(bx2); c1).
If bx1 > 0 then,
(i) p2(x1; x2) > p2(bx1; bx2), and
(ii) 1(x1; x2; c1) < 1(bx1; bx2; c1).
Proof. (i) By assumption, bx1 = e1( 2(bx2); c1) > 0. Therefore, x2 > bx2 implies
p2(bx1; x2) > p2(bx1; bx2). Assume rst that x1  bx1. Then, clearly, p2(x1; x2) 
p2(bx1; x2). Combining the last two inequalities, we arrive at p2(x1; x2) > p2(bx1; bx2),
as claimed. Assume, next, that x1 > bx1. Then, the necessary rst-order conditions
associated with the respective optimality of bx1 and x1 hold. As for bx1, we nd
1h
0(bx1)2h(bx2)
(1h(bx1) + 2h(bx2))2 = c1. (35)
Multiplying by h(bx2)=h0(bx1), where  = 2=1 as before, yields
(p2(bx1; bx2))2 = c1h(bx2)
h0(bx1) . (36)
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Similarly, one shows that the optimality of x1 implies
(p2(x1; x2))
2 =
c1h(x2)
h0(x1)
. (37)
Recalling that h is strictly increasing and that h0 is weakly declining, we see that
(p2(x1; x2))
2 > (p2(bx1; bx2))2. The claim follows.
(ii) As a consequence of the envelope theorem,
d1(e1( 2(x2); c1); x2; c1)
dx2
=
@1(x1; x2; c1)
@x2

x1=e1( 2(x2);c1) (38)
=   1h(
e1( 2(x2); c1))2h0(x2)
(1h(
e1( 2(x2); c1)) + 2h(x2))2 (39)
< 0. (40)
Thus, player 1 benets from the lowered e¤ort of player 2. This proves the second
claim, and hence, the lemma. 
Lemma A.5 (Improved Jensens inequality)43
Let g : (1;1)  (1;1) ! R be a twice continuously di¤erentiable function with
Hessian matrix
Hg  Hg(x; y) =
0B@ @2g(x;y)@x2 @2g(x;y)@x@y
@2g(x;y)
@y@x
@2g(x;y)
@y2
1CA ; (41)
and let Y be a nondegenerate random variable with nite support in (1;1). If

x > 1; y  x2; dx > 0; dy > 0; dy
dx
>
y   1
x  1

) (dx dy) (Hg(x; y))

dx
dy

> 0, (42)
43This auxiliary result is used in the proof of Proposition 3. It also helped us to see through the
analysis of sequentially taken disclosure decisions (see fn. 40). Alternative extensions of Jensens
inequality have been proposed by Pittenger (1990), Guljaet al. (1998), and Liao and Berg (2017),
in particular. However, those results do not render the payo¤ comparisons made in the proof of
Proposition 3.
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then
E

g
 
Y; Y 2

> g
 
E[Y ]; E[Y 2]

. (43)
Proof. By induction. Assume rst that the random variable Y has precisely two
possible realizations y1; y2 2 (1;1). Without loss of generality, y1 < y2. Consider
the auxiliary mapping f : [0; 1]! R2 dened through
f(t) = (1  t)

y1
y21

+ t

y2
y22

(t 2 [0; 1]). (44)
By assumption, g is strictly convex along the straight line described by f .44 In
particular, the composed mapping g  f is strictly convex. Therefore, when t is
considered a random variable that assumes the value t = 0 with probability q1 =
pr(Y = y1) > 0 and the value t = 1 with probability q2 = 1   q1 = pr(Y = y2) > 0,
then
E[g(Y; Y 2)] = E[g(f(t))] (45)
> g(f(E[t])) (46)
= g
 
q1y1 + (1  q1)y2; q1y21 + (1  q1)y22

(47)
= g([E[Y ]; E[Y 2]): (48)
This proves the claim in the case that Y has two realizations only. Suppose that
the claim has been shown for K  2 realizations, and assume that Y has K + 1
realizations y1 < ::: < yK+1, with respective probabilities qk = pr(Y = yk) > 0,
where k = 1; :::; K + 1. Consider the random variable Y 0 that assumes value yk, for
44To see this, let x = (1   t)y1 + ty2 > 1, y = (1   t)y21 + ty22  x2, dx = y2   y1 > 0, and
dy = y
2
2   y21 > 0. Then, dy=dx = y2 + y1 > 1 + y1 = (y   1)=(x   1), so that the precondition in
(42) indeed holds true.
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k = 2; :::; K + 1, with probability
q0k =
qk
1  q1 =
qkPK+1
=2 q
. (49)
Thus, Y 0 follows a conditional distribution after learning Y 6= y1. In particular,
E[Y ] = q1y1 + (1  q1)E[Y 0], (50)
E[Y 2] = q1y
2
1 + (1  q1)E[(Y 0)2]. (51)
Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, inequality (43) holds for Y 0, i.e.,
E

g
 
Y 0; (Y 0)2

> g
 
E[Y 0]; E[(Y 0)2]

. (52)
As above, we dene an auxiliary mapping
ef(t) = (1  t)y1
y21

+ t

E[Y 0]
E[(Y 0)2]

(t 2 [0; 1]). (53)
Clearly, E[(Y 0)2] > E[Y 0]2. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 3, the vector that
directs from
 
y1
y21

to
 
E[Y 0]
E[(Y 0)2]

is steeper than the vector that directs from
 
y1
y21

to 
E[Y 0]
E[Y 0]2

. Hence, g is strictly convex also along the linear path described by ef .45 Thus,
g  ef is strictly convex.
45Indeed, letting x = (1  t)y1+ tE[Y 0] > 1, y = (1  t)y21 + tE[Y 02 > x2, dx = E[Y 0] y1 > 0, and
dy = E[(Y
0)2] y21 > 0, we see that dy=dx = (E[(Y 0)2] y21)=(E[Y 0] y1) > (E[(Y 0)]2 y21)=(E[Y 0] 
y1) = E[Y
0] + y1 > 1 + y1 = (y   1)=(x  1), so that the precondition in (42) holds true also in this
case.
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Figure 3. Improved Jensens inequality.
Therefore, considering t as a random variable that assumes the value t = 0 with
probability q1 = pr(Y = y1) > 0 and the value t = 1 with probability 1   q1 > 0,
relationships (50-53) imply
E[g(Y; Y 2)] = q1g(y1; y
2
1) + (1  q1)E[g(Y 0; (Y 0)2] (54)
> q1g(y1; y
2
1) + (1  q1)g
 
E[Y 0]; E[(Y 0)2]

(55)
= E[g( ef(t))] (56)
> g( ef(E[t])) (57)
= g
 
q1y1 + (1  q1)E[Y 0]; q1y21 + (1  q1)E[(Y 0)2]

(58)
= g(E[Y ]; E[Y 2]). (59)
Thus, the claim holds for K + 1 realizations. This completes the induction, and
thereby, the proof of the lemma. 
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Appendix B: Proofs
This Appendix contains formal proofs of the results stated in the body of this paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. This is a special case of a result in Ewerhart and Quartieri
(2013). The details are omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (ii) will be proved rst. So assume that all types of both
players are active in the contest. There are two cases.
Case A. All types of both players conceal their private information. We make use of
Lemma A.3. Letting i = 2 in (13) yields
2h(

2(c2)) 
1
2
 2h(2(c2)) +
1  2
2
 1h(1(c1)). (60)
Combining this with (14) delivers
2h(

2(c2)) 

1
2
 b + 1  22

| {z }

 1h(1(c1)), (61)
where  = 2=1, as before. Letting i = 1 in (13), and plugging the result into (61)
yields
2h(

2(c2))   

1
1
 1h(1(c1)) +
1  1
1
 2h(2(c2))

. (62)
To be able to solve for 2h(

2(c2)), we assume for the moment that
1  1  1
1
> 0. (63)
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Then, rewriting (62), we obtain
2h(

2(c2)) 
(
  1
1
1    1 1
1
)
| {z }

 1h(1(c1)). (64)
Thus, 2h(

2(c2))    1h(1(c1)). We claim that inequality (63) holds. Indeed,
starting with Assumption 1, we nd that
 <
1 + 22   2
2  1  b (65)
, b + 1 < 222  1 (66)
, (=b) + 1
2| {z }
=+1
<
2
2  1| {z }
=
1
2 1+1
(67)
,  < 1
2  1 (68)
, 1  (1  1)
1
>

1
. (69)
Clearly, this implies (63). Moreover, it can be readily veried that (69) implies  < 1.
Therefore, 2h(

2(c2))  1h(1(c1)). Using the monotonicity of equilibrium bid
schedules (Lemma A.2 above), this proves
2h(

2(c2))  1h(1(c1)) (c1 2 C1; c2 2 C2). (70)
Clearly this proves part (ii) for the case that all types of both players conceal their
private information.
Case B. Some type of some player discloses her private information. The conclusion
remains valid even if not all types conceal. To understand why, note that disclosure
by some types means that, in the relevant information set at the contest stage, the
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sets C1 and C2 are replaced by nonempty subsets, respectively. Therefore, player 1s
lowest relative resolve  = c2=c1 rises weakly. Given that the curvature   1 stays
unchanged, this implies that b(; ) rises weakly as well. Further, player 1 and 2s
predictabilities 1 and 2 fall weakly, while the net bias  stays the same. Therefore,
Assumption 1 continues to hold, and the argument detailed under case A goes through
as before.
This concludes the proof of part (ii) of the lemma.
It remains to verify part (i) of the lemma, i.e., that all types of player 1 are active.
Suppose not. Then, all types of player 2 are active. Denote by ? 6= C1 ( C1 the set
of active types of player 1, and by q1 =
P
c12C1 q1(c1) the ex-ante probability that
player 1 is active. Then, since any positive bid wins against an inactive type with
probability one, the corresponding terms in player 2s rst-order condition vanish, so
that X
c12C1
q1(c1)
2h
0(2(c2))1h(

1(c1))
(1h(

1(c1)) + 2h(

2(c2)))
2
= c2 (c2 2 C2). (71)
In the modied contest, player 1s type set C1 is replaced by the subset C1 , the
probability distribution q1(:) is replaced by q1(c1) = q1(c1)=q

1, and player 2s type set
C2 is replaced by
C2
q1
=

c2
q1
 c2 2 C2 . (72)
Denote by 1jC1 the restriction of the mapping 

1 : C1 ! R+ to C1 , and by 2jq1 :
C2
q1
! R+ the bid schedule for player 2 in the modied contest that satises 2jq1 (
c2
q1
) =
2(c2) for any c2 2 C2. We claim that (1jC1 ; 

2jq1 ) is a Bayesian equilibrium in the
modied contest. Indeed, quite obviously, the rst-order condition of any active type
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of player 1 holds in the modied contest. Moreover, dividing (71) by q1 > 0, we get
X
c12C1
q1(c1)
q1
2h
0(2(c2))1h(

1(c1))
(1h(

1(c1)) + 2h(

2(c2)))
2
=
c2
q1
(c2 2 C2), (73)
i.e., also the rst-order condition of any type of player 2 holds in the modied contest.
Since all types of both players are active in (1jC1 ; 

2jq1 ) and since, in addition, the
expected payo¤ against a player that is always active is strictly concave in the own
bid, this proves the claim, i.e., (1jC1 ; 

2jq1 ) is indeed a Bayesian equilibrium in the
modied contest. Next, one notes that, since Assumption 1 holds for the original
contest, Assumption 1 holds also for the modied contest (because 1 and  rise
weakly, while , , and 2 stay the same). From the rst part of the proof, applied
to the modied contest, it therefore follows that
2h(

2(c2))  1h(1(c1)) (c1 2 C1 ; c2 2 C2). (74)
Now, by assumption, some types of player 1 remain inactive in the original contest.
Since, by Lemma A.2, 1 is monotone declining, this clearly implies 

1(c1) = 0.
Consequently, the marginal productivity at the zero bid level h0(0) = lim"&0
h(")
"
is
nite. Moreover, type c1s marginal payo¤ at the zero bid level is weakly negative,
i.e.,
Ec2

1h
0(0)
2h(

2(c2))

 c1: (75)
Plugging (74) into (75), we see that
h0(0)
h(1(c1))
 c1 (c1 2 C1). (76)
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Moreover, Assumption 1 implies
2
1
=  <
1 + 22   2
2  1| {z }
1
 b(; )| {z }

  = c2
c1
. (77)
Multiplying inequality (76) by (=q1) > 0, exploiting (77), and taking expectations
over all c1 2 C1 , we get
X
c12C1
q1(c1)
q1
2h
0(0)
1h(

1(c1))
<
c2
q1
. (78)
Thus, in the modied contest, the marginal expected payo¤ of type (c2=q

1) at the
zero bid level is strictly negative. But this is impossible given that she is active and
her expected payo¤ against 1jC1 is strictly concave. The contradiction shows that,
indeed, all types of player 1 are active in the original contest. 
Proof of Theorem 1. It is shown rst that incomplete revelation is incompatible
with the assumption of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The proof is by contradic-
tion. Suppose that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which not all private
information is disclosed. Then, there is at least one information set on the equilib-
rium path in which at least one of the players has at least two types that may realize
with positive probability. By suitably redening C1 and C2, we may assume without
loss of generality that all types conceal their types in that scenario. Suppose rst
that jC2j  2. Then, Proposition 1 implies that the weakest type of the underdog
has a strict incentive to unilaterally deviate at the revelation stage, in conict to the
equilibrium assumption. Suppose next that jC2j = 1. Then, since there is incomplete
information, jC1j  2. But, again, this cannot be part of a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium by Proposition 2. Thus, either way, we obtain a contradiction, and the claim
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follows.
Next, it will be shown that there are o¤-equilibrium beliefs such that self-disclosure
by all types of both players constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To this end,
we specify beliefs 01 and 
0
2 as follows. The underdog expects a favorite that does
not disclose her private information to be of type c1 = c1 with probability one. Thus,
01(c1) = 1 if c1 = c1, and 
0
1(c1) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, the favorite expects an
underdog that does not disclose her private information to be of type c2 = c2 with
probability one. Thus, 02(c2) = 1 if c2 = c2, and 
0
2(c2) = 0 otherwise.
46 To check
the equilibrium property, consider rst an arbitrary type c1 2 C1 of the favorite. If
c1 complies with equilibrium self-disclosure, and is matched with some type c2 2 C2
of the underdog, then c1 receives a complete-information equilibrium payo¤ of
1(c1; c2) = 1(x

1(c1; c2); x

2(c1; c2); c1) (79)
= 1(e1(x2(c1; c2); c1); x2(c1; c2); c1). (80)
If, however, the favorite chooses to not disclose her type, then, given the o¤-equilibrium
beliefs specied above, an underdog of type c2 expects the favorite to be of the worst-
case type c1 and, having revealed her own type c2 to the favorite, chooses an e¤ort
of x2(c1; c2). Responding optimally to type c2s bid, the deviating favorite of type c1
chooses an e¤ort of e1(x2(c1; c2); c1) at the contest stage, and consequently receives a
payo¤ of
dev1 (c1; c2) = 1(
e1(x2(c1; c2); c1); x2(c1; c2); c1). (81)
A straightforward application of Monaco and Sabarwal (2016, Th. 3) shows that,
46Alternatively, one could argue that the least e¢ cient type of the favorite and the most e¢ cient
type of the underdog do not disclose their types, in which case the consideration of o¤-equilibrium
beliefs would not be necessary in the rst place.
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given Assumption 1, x2(c1; c2)  x2(c1; c2).47 We claim that 1(c1; c2)  dev1 (c1; c2).
Indeed, if x2(c1; c2) < x

2(c1; c2) then, by Lemma A.4(ii), 

1(c1; c2) > 
dev
1 (c1; c2).
Moreover, if x2(c1; c2) = x

2(c1; c2) then 

1(c1; c2) = 
dev
1 (c1; c2), which proves the
claim. Taking expectations over all c2 2 C2 yields
Ec2 [

1(c1; c2)]  Ec2

dev1 (c1; c2)

(c1 2 C1). (82)
Hence, a deviation is not protable for any type c1 2 C1. On the other hand, if
any type of the underdog deviates, and the favorite interprets this as a tactic of
the strongest type of the underdog, then one can show in complete analogy that
the equilibrium condition holds.48 It follows that self-disclosure by all types of both
players is indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This proves the theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Let 2;b2 2 X2 with 2  b2, and c1 2 C1. By assumption,
player 1s domain condition holds at (2; c1). We wish to show that x1  e1(2; c1) >e1(b2; c1)  bx1. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that bx1  x1. From the domain
condition, we have x1 > 0. Therefore, both x1 and bx1 are positive, so that the
corresponding rst-order conditions imply
Ec2

1h
0(x1)2h(2(c2))
(1h(x1) + 2h(2(c2)))
2

= Ec2
"
1h
0(bx1)2h(b2(c2))
(1h(bx1) + 2h(b2(c2)))2
#
= c1. (83)
Fix some c2 2 C2 for the moment. Letting x = 1h(e1(2; c1)) and y = 2h(2(c2)),
the domain condition implies x > y. Clearly, the mapping y 7! y=(x+ y)2 is strictly
47For a self-contained argument, it su¢ ces to replicate earlier arguments. Indeed, suppose that
x2(c1; c2) > x

2(c1; c2). Clearly, all equilibrium e¤orts are positive under complete information.
Therefore, using Lemma 2(ii), player 1s domain condition holds at (x2(c1; c2); c1), so that, by
Lemma 3(i), x1(c1; c2) > x

1(c1; c2). Moreover, using Lemma 2(ii) another time, player 2s domain
condition is seen to hold at (x1(c1; c2); c2), so that by Lemma 3(ii), x

2(c1; c2) < x

2(c1; c2), which
yields the desired contradiction. The claim follows.
48The details are omitted.
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increasing over the interval [0; x]. Therefore, noting that 2  b2 implies y  by 
2h(b2(c2)), we see that
1h
0(x1)2h(2(c2))
(1h(x1) + 2h(2(c2)))
2
 1h
0(x1)2h(b2(c2))
(1h(x1) + 2h(b2(c2)))2 (c2 2 C2), (84)
with strict inequality for at least one c2 2 C2. Moreover, from bx1  x1,
1h
0(x1)2h(b2(c2))
(1h(x1) + 2h(
b2(c2)))2  1h
0(bx1)2h(b2(c2))
(1h(bx1) + 2h(b2(c2)))2 (c2 2 C2). (85)
Combining (84) and (85), and subsequently taking expectations , we arrive at
Ec2

1h
0(x1)2h(2(c2))
(1h(x1) + 2h(2(c2)))
2

> Ec2
"
1h
0(bx1)2h(b2(c2))
(1h(bx1) + 2h(b2(c2)))2
#
, (86)
in conict with (83). The contradiction shows that x1 > bx1, as claimed. Moreover,
if player 1s domain condition holds for any c1 2 C1, then e1(2; c1) > e1(b2; c1) for
any c1 2 C1, which indeed implies 1(2)  1(b2).
(ii) The proof is similar. Let 1;b1 2 X1 with 1  b1, and c2 2 C2. By assump-
tion, player 2s domain condition holds at (b1; c2). Suppose that x2  e2(1; c2) e2(b1; c2)  bx2. Then, from the domain condition, bx2 > 0. Hence,
Ec1
264 2h0(bx2)1h(b1(c1))
1h(b1(c1)) + 2h(bx2)2
375 = Ec1  2h0(x2)1h(1(c1))(1h(1(c1)) + 2h(x2))2

= c2. (87)
Fix some c1 2 C1, and let bx = 2h(e2(b1; c2)) and by = 1h(b1(c1)). By the domain
condition, bx < by. Moreover, the mapping by 7! by=(bx + by)2 is strictly declining for
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by  bx. Hence, given that b1  1 implies by  y  1h(1(c1)), we see that
2h
0(bx2)1h(b1(c1))
1h(
b1(c1)) + 2h(bx2)2 
2h
0(bx2)1h(1(c1))
(1h(1(c1)) + 2h(bx2))2 (c1 2 C1), (88)
with strict inequality for some c1 2 C1. Moreover, from bx2  x2,
2h
0(bx2)1h(1(c1))
(1h(1(c2)) + 2h(bx2))2  2h
0(x2)1h(1(c1))
(2h(1(c1)) + 2h(x1))
2
(c1 2 C1). (89)
Combining (88) and (89), and taking expectations, we arrive at
Ec1
264 2h0(bx2)1h(b1(c1))
1h(b1(c1)) + 2h(bx2)2
375 > Ec1  2h0(x2)1h(1(c1))(1h(1(c1)) + 2h(x2))2

, (90)
in contradiction to (87). It follows that, indeed, bx2 > x2. In particular, provided that
player 2s domain condition holds for any c2 2 C2, it follows that 2(1)  2(b1).
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. As noted in the body of the paper, the conclusions of
Proposition 1 are immediate if 2(c2) = 0. We may, therefore, assume without loss
of generality that 2(c2) > 0. Since, by Lemma A.2, the equilibrium bid schedule 

2
is weakly declining, actually all types of player 2 are active in 2. Using Lemma A.2
another time, one sees that 2 is even strictly declining. These observations will be
tacitly used below. We now prove the three assertions made in the statement of the
proposition.
(i) First, it is shown that self-disclosure induces the weakest type of the underdog
to strictly raise her bid, i.e., 2(c2) < x
#
2 . To provoke a contradiction, suppose that
2(c2)  x#2 . Then, because 2 is strictly declining and there are at least two possible
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type realizations for player 2, we get 2   2(x#2 ). We claim that player 1s domain
condition holds at (2; c1), for any c1 2 C1. To see this, take some c1 2 C1. Then,
from Lemma 2(i), e1(2; c1) = 1(c1) > 0. Further, since all types of player 2 are
active in 2, Lemma 2(ii) implies that p1(

1(c1); 

2(c2)) >
1
2
for any c2 2 C2, which
proves the claim. We may, therefore, apply Lemma 3(i) so as to obtain
1 = 1(

2)  1( 2(x#2 )) = #1 . (91)
Next, it is claimed that player 2s domain condition holds at (#1 ; c2). Since (
#
1 (:); x
#
2 )
is an equilibrium in the contest with one-sided incomplete information, we have x#2 >
0, i.e., player 2 is active with probability one. Applying Lemma 2(ii) shows, therefore,
that p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) <
1
2
, for any c1 2 C1. Since e2(#1 ; c2) = x#2 , this means that
p2(
#
1 (c1);
e2(#1 ; c2)) < 12 , for any c1 2 C1. I.e., player 2s domain condition at
(#1 ; c2) is indeed satised. Therefore, using relationship (91) and Lemma 3(ii), we
see that
2(c2) = e2(1; c2) < e2(#1 ; c2) = x#2 , (92)
in contradiction to 2(c2)  x#2 . Thus, 2(c2) < x#2 , as claimed.
(ii) Next, it is shown that, after disclosure, the probability of winning for the
weakest type of the underdog rises strictly, i.e.,
p#2 = Ec1 [p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 )] > Ec1 [p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2))] = p

2. (93)
In fact, we will prove the somewhat stronger statement
p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) > p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2)) (c1 2 C1). (94)
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Take some type c1 2 C1. It is claimed rst that e1( 2(2(c2)); c1) > 0, as shown
in the left diagram of Figure 4. Indeed, because player 2 is always active in 2,
the mapping x1 7! Ec2 [1(x1; 2(c2); c1)] is strictly concave on R+, and vanishes at
x1 = 0. Therefore, the optimality of 

1(c1) > 0 implies Ec2 [1(

1(c1); 

2(c2); c1)] > 0.
But the at bid schedule  2(

2(c2)) is everywhere weakly lower than 

2. Therefore,
Ec2 [1(

1(c1);  2(

2(c2)); c1)] > 0, i.e., type c1 is able to realize a positive payo¤
against the at bid schedule  2(

2(c2)). Since 

2(c2) > 0, it follows that type c1s best-
response bid against  2(

2(c2)) is positive, as claimed. Next, from the previous step,
we know that x#2 > 

2(c2). Invoking Lemma A.4(i), and noting that 
#
1 = 1( 2(x
#
2 )),
it follows that
p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) > p2(
e1( 2(2(c2)); c1); 2(c2)) (c1 2 C1). (95)
Next, comparing the strictly declining equilibrium bid schedule 2 = 2(

1) with the
at bid schedule  2(

2(c2)), and recalling that there are at least two types, we obtain
2   2(2(c2)). Moreover, as seen above, all types of player 2 are active. Hence,
by Lemma 2(ii), p1(

1(c1); 

2(c2)) >
1
2
for any c1 2 C1 and any c2 2 C2, so that viae1(2; c1) = 1(c1), player 1s domain condition is seen to hold at (2; c1), for any
c1 2 C1. Therefore, by Lemma 3(i), 1 = 1(2)  1( 2(2(c2))), as illustrated in
Figure 4.49 In particular,
1(c1)  e1( 2(2(c2)); c1) (c1 2 C1). (96)
Therefore,
p2(e1( 2(2(c2)); c1); 2(c2))  p2(1(c1); 2(c2)) (c1 2 C1). (97)
49The gure shows an example where x#2 < 

2(c2). In general, we may also have that x
#
2  2(c2).
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Combining (95) and (97) yields (94). In particular, this proves p#2 > p

2, as claimed.
Figure 4. Proof of Proposition 1(ii).
(iii) Finally, we show that the weakest type of the underdog has a strict incentive
to disclose her type. Clearly, the equilibrium e¤ort x#2 is positive. One can check
that type c2s rst-order condition is equivalent to
Ec1

p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) 

p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 )
2
= c2(x
#
2 ). (98)
Exploiting (98), we obtain for type c2s expected payo¤ from self-disclosure,
#2 (c2) = Ec1

p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 )
2
+ c2

(x#2 )  x#2

. (99)
In a completely analogous fashion, we can convince ourselves that concealment grants
type c2 a payo¤ of
2(c2) = Ec1

(p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2)))
2+ c2 ((2(c2))  2(c2)) . (100)
Now, from (94), we see that
Ec1

p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 )
2
> Ec1

(p2(

1(c1); 

2(c2)))
2 . (101)
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Moreover, from Lemma A.1, 0  1, so that the mapping x2 7! (x2) x2 is monotone
increasing in x2. But, as shown above, 

2(c2) < x
#
2 . It follows that the weakest type
of the underdog has indeed a strict incentive to reveal her type. This proves the nal
claim, and concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since x1 and x

2 are equilibrium e¤orts under complete
information, we have x1 > 0 and x

2 > 0. Similarly, one notes that x
#
2 > 0. Moreover,
by Lemma 2(i), all types of player 1 are active in #1 , so that by Lemma A.2, the
bid schedule #1 is strictly declining. We now prove the four assertions made in the
statement of Proposition 2.
(i) It is claimed that x2 < x
#
2 . To provoke a contradiction, suppose that x

2  x#2 .
Lemma 2(ii) implies p1(x1; x

2) >
1
2
, so that in view of x1 = e1(x2; c1), player 1s
domain condition holds at (x2; c1). Hence, by Lemma 3(i), if even x

2 > x
#
2 , then
x1 = e1(x2; c1) > e1(x#2 ; c1) = #1 (c1). (102)
If, however, x2 = x
#
2 , then it is immediate that x

1 = 
#
1 (c1). Thus, either way, we
arrive at x1  #1 (c1), so that  1(x1)   1(#1 (c1)). Moreover, given that player 1 has
at least two types, and that #1 is strictly declining,  1(
#
1 (c1))  #1 . Hence,  1(x1) 
#1 . Lemma 2(ii) implies that p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) <
1
2
for any c1 2 C1. Thus, recalling
that x#2 = e2(#1 ; c#2 ), player 2s domain condition holds at (#1 ; c#2 ). Therefore, using
Lemma 3(ii), we arrive at
x#2 =
e2(#1 ; c#2 ) > e2( 1(x1); c#2 ) = x2, (103)
a contradiction. It follows that x2 < x
#
2 , as claimed.
(ii) Next, it is shown that x1 < 
#
1 (c1). From the previous step, we know that
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x#2 > x

2. Via Lemma 2(ii), we see that p1(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ) >
1
2
. Thus, the domain
condition for player 1 holds at (x#2 ; c1). Lemma 3(i) implies, therefore, that
#1 (c1) =
e1(x#2 ; c1) > e1(x2; c1) = x1. (104)
Thus, the e¤ort of the strongest type of the favorite will indeed be strictly lower after
self-disclosure.
(iii) Given part (i) above, we have x2 < x
#
2 . Recalling that x

1 > 0, Lemma A.4(i)
implies p2(x1; x

2) < p2(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ), so that p1(x

1; x

2) > p1(
#
1 (c1); x
#
2 ). Thus, type c1
indeed wins with a strictly higher probability after self-disclosure.
(iv) The claim that 1 > 
#
1 follows now directly from Lemma A.4(ii). This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Let c#1 2 C1 denote the public type of the favorite.
For the unbiased lottery contest, an interior equilibrium may be easily derived from
the corresponding rst-order conditions (Hurley and Shogren, 1998a; Epstein and
Mealem, 2013; Zhang and Zhou, 2016). In our set-up, this yields equilibrium bids
x#1 =
 
E
p
c2

c#1 + E [c2]
!2
, and (105)
#2 (c2) =
s
x#1
c2
  x#1 (c2 2 C2), (106)
where we dropped, for convenience, the subscript c2 from the expectation operator.
Using these expressions, total expected costs under mandatory concealment are easily
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derived as
CMC = c#1 x
#
1 + E[c2
#
2 (c2)] (107)
= (c#1   E[c2])x#1 + E[
p
c2]
q
x#1 (108)
=
(c#1   E[c2])E[
p
c2]
2
(c#1 + E[c2])
2
+
E[
p
c2]
2
c#1 + E[c2]
(109)
=
2c#1 E[
p
c2]
2
(c#1 + E[c2])
2
. (110)
Note that this formula entails, in particular, the complete-information case where c2
is public as well. Therefore, being an expectation over such complete-information
scenarios, total expected costs under full revelation amount to
CFR = E
"
2c#1 c2
(c#1 + c2)
2
#
. (111)
To compare the two expressions, we apply Lemma A.5 with Y =
q
c2=c
#
1 and
g(x; y) = g1(x; y)  2x2(1+y)2 . The Hessian of the mapping g1 is given by
Hg1(x; y) =
0BB@
4
(1 + y)2
  8x
(1 + y)3
  8x
(1 + y)3
12x2
(1 + y)4
1CCA . (112)
It su¢ ces to show that, for any x > 1, y  x2, dx > 0, dy > 0 such that dydx >
y 1
x 1 ,
the quadratic form
(dx dy) (Hg1(x; y))

dx
dy

=
4
(1 + y)2
dx
2   16x
(1 + y)3
dxdy +
12x2
(1 + y)4
dy
2 (113)
=
4dx
2
(1 + y)2

1  x
1 + y
dy
dx

1  3x
1 + y
dy
dx

(114)
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attains a positive value. To see this, one checks that
x
y + 1
 dy
dx
>
x
y + 1
 y   1
x  1| {z }
increasing in y
 x
x2 + 1
 x
2   1
x  1 =
x2 + x
x2 + 1
> 1. (115)
Clearly then, the right-hand side of (114) is positive. This proves the claim. It follows
that
CFR = E
"
2(c2=c
#
1 )
(1 + (c2=c
#
1 ))
2
#
>
2E
q
c2=c
#
1
2
(1 + E[c2=c
#
1 ])
2
= CMC, (116)
i.e., total expected costs are indeed strictly higher under full revelation than under
mandatory concealment. In particular, given that, by equation (22), expected costs
in the lottery contest are the same across contestants, and given that the favorites
type is public, the favorite exerts a higher e¤ort under full revelation than under
mandatory concealment.
(ii) From (105) and (106), player 1s probability of winning is easily determined
as
pMC1 = E
"
x#1
x#1 + 
#
2 (c2)
#
= E
q
x#1 c2

=
E
p
c2
2
c#1 + E [c2]
, (117)
under mandatory concealment, and by
pFR1 = E

c2
c#1 + c2

(118)
under full revelation. We again apply Lemma A.5 for Y =
q
c2=c
#
1 , but using this
time the mapping g(x; y) = g2(x; y)  x21+y . The corresponding Hessian reads
Hg2(x; y) =
0BB@
2
1 + y
  2x
(1 + y)2
  2x
(1 + y)2
2x2
(1 + y)3
1CCA : (119)
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Suppose that x > 1, y  x2, dx > 0, and dy > 0. Then, clearly,
(dx dy) (Hg2(x; y))

dx
dy

=
2dx
2
1 + y

1  x
1 + y
dy
dx
2
 0. (120)
Moreover, from relationship (115), inequality (120) is even strict, which implies strict
convexity of g2 along the relevant linear path segment. Thus, we have
pFR1 = E
"
(c2=c
#
1 )
1 + (c2=c
#
1 )
#
>
E
q
c2=c
#
1
2
1 + E[c2=c
#
1 ]
= pMD1 , (121)
and, consequently, also pFR2 < p
MD
2 .
(iii) Since expected costs are equal across players in the lottery contest, ex-ante
expected payo¤s for the underdog are given by FR2 = p
FR
2   C
FR
2
under full revelation,
and by MD2 = p
MD
2   C
MD
2
under mandatory concealment. As seen above, pFR2 < p
MD
2
and CFR > CMD. Hence, FR2 < 
MD
2 , as claimed. 
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